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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

:
:

BLAINE OLSEN LARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
14678

:
:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Blaine Olsen Larson, appeals from
an order of the Fourth District Court denying his motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty to a charge of knowingly and
intentionally possessing marijuana, a Class A Misdemeanor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On March 5, 1976, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock
accepted appellant's change of plea from not guilty to guilty.
RELIEr SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered by the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 19, 1975, a complaint was filed in
Provo City Court charging the appellant with knowing
possession of marijuana in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953), as amended, and that appellant
had been previously convicted of possession of a controlled
substance, making the penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2) (b) (ii) (1953), as amended, applicable (maximum
sentence of one year in the county jail and $1,000 fine).
Appellant was arraigned the same day and requested a
preliminary hearing.

On November 25, 1975, appellant

appeared in the city court represented by his appointed
counsel, Gary H. Weight, and waived a preliminary hearing.
Appellant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District
Court.

The Utah County Attorney filed an information in

the district court alleging that "Blaine Larson knowingly
and intentionally possessed a Schedule I controlled
substance, to wit: marijuana." (R.47).

On December 4,

1975, appellant was arraigned in the District Court, and
at this time the information was read to the appellant,
and a copy was handed to him.

On December 12, 197 5, the

appellant entered a plea of not guilty, through his
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appointed counsel, Gary H. Weight.

On March 5, 1976, the

appellant appeared before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock
and requested a change of plea.

The court conducted a

thorough hearing before accepting the guilty plea.

In

response to the court's questioning, the appellant indicated
that he understood the consequences of a plea, that it
constituted a waiver of his right to a jury trial, and
that the punishment imposed would not depend upon a guilty
plea (R.31,32).

The county attorney questioned the appellant

to insure that he understood that a subsequent conviction
might result in a felony charge (R.33).

The appellant waived

the reading of the information, and the court explained that
the information generally charged the "offense of knowingly and
intentionally possession (sic) marijuana." (R.33).

The appel-

lant then stated that he was pleading guilty because he was
guilty and for no other reason, and the court expressed its
satisfaction that the plea was entered "freely and voluntarily,
without any coercion, promises or threats of whatever nature
. . . intentionally, and . . . with a full and complete understanding of the consequences." (R.34).

Appellant was then

referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a
pre-sentence investigation.

On March 15, 1976, the appellant

met with the probation agent and expressed his dissatisfaction
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with the guilty plea (R.38).

On March 26, 1976, Mr. Weight

requested and was granted permission to withdraw as counsel.
Appellant's new counsel, Larry N. Long, then addressed the
court, and made a motion to withdraw his client's guilty
plea.

On April 2, 1976, a hearing was held on that motion,

and the appellant testified in his own behalf.

On April 6,

1976, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson issued a ruling that
the plea was entered freely, voluntarily and understandingly
and denied the motion (R.28).

f

Appellant subsequently filed

a motion to reconsider the ruling, and an affidavit alleging
that appellant had not knowingly possessed marijuana, that

4

this fact was unknown to his original counsel and was only
made known to his present counsel one day prior to his original
appearance (March 26, 1976) (R.21).

Appellant further alleged

<

that he had withheld the information because he thought it
"irrelevant," but that as he had now been made aware that it
constituted a defense, he wished to withdraw his plea.

A

<

hearing was held on this motion on May 21, 1976, and the court
relied on its previous ruling, refusing permission to withdraw
the guilty plea.

'

On May 28, 1976, the appellant was sentenced to one
year in the county jail provided that after the expiration of
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ninety days he could apply for a suspension of the unserved
portion of the sentence (R.16).

Appellant's previous

conviction for possession of a controlled substance occurred
on March 26, 1975.

He was twenty years old at the time he

entered the guilty plea at issue in this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF
GUILTY.
Appellant has correctly stated the law that
under the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953), as
amended, and according to the great weight of authority,
a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and that a criminal
defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of
right.

State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963).

Appellant is contending, however, that this discretion is
of such a limited scope that any motion made prior to
sentencing, supported by an affidavit, must be granted,
and that a refusal to do so amounts to a reversible abuse
of discretion.
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Respondent submits that this argument is faulty
in two particulars.

First, it assumes that a trial court

must accept as true whatever self-serving allegations a
criminal defendant may chose to make in order to escape the
effects of his guilty plea.

This Court has held that a

trial court need not accept evidence offered by a defendant
to show that a guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made.
323 (1969).

Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294f 452 P.2d

Second, appellant's position, if adopted, would

effectively deny the trial court the opportunity to exercise
its discretion in determining whether the allegations warrant
a withdrawal of the plea.

The trial court's discretion would

not be of any effect if a trial court could not discriminate
between meritorious and obviously frivolous grounds for the
withdrawal of a plea.
Appellant's brief cites a plethora of authority
where a trial court's refusal to allow a withdrawal of a guilty
plea has been held an abuse of discretion.

Respondent does

not challenge these authorities ". . • as they do nothing more
than to illustrate when, under given factual situations, the
appellate courts have, or have not, seen fit to overrule the
actions of trial courts in the exercise of the sound discretion which the law vests in such tribunals."

Plum, at 126, 672.
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All of the cases are factually dissimilar to the case at
bar.

Appellant was at all times represented by a competent

member of the bar who demonstrated an identity of interests
with the appellant.

At the time appellant entered his plea,

he was an intelligent adult who had been previously convicted
of the same offense.

Such a previous conviction is evidence

that the appellant understood the charge against him, the
elements thereof, and the procedure in a criminal trial.
Hahn v. Turner/ 530 P.2d 789 (Utah 1975); Combs v. Turner,
25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437 (1971); and Price v. Turner,
28 Utah 2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972).
The information charging the appellant was clear,
comprehensible to a

layman, and set forth all the essential

elements of the crime.

The proceedings were not hurried,

and no plea bargain was involved in obtaining appellant's
plea.

There was no fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct

on the part of either counsel or the courts.
The case of State v. Virgi, et al., 81 N.E.2d 295,
84 Ohio.App. 15 (1948), upon which appellant most heavily
relies, is not

apropos.

The case is decided as much upon

the grounds that the trial judge received ex parte information
via a telephone conversation with the prosecutor which caused
him to withhold a tentative plea agreement as upon the grounds
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cited by appellant.

In addition, there were factors in

the Virgi decis ion that are not present here*

First* the

defendants had discovered new evidence in the Virgi case.
In this appeal, the information relied on by appellant was
all available in his defense.

Second, in the Virgi ease,

the defendantshad made a credible allegation that they
had misunderstood the nature of the charge and the effect
of a guilty plea.

Appellant can make no such claim in

this appeal.
Appellant has cited a number of older authorities
that contain language to the effect that "all doubts should
be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits."

Respondent

submits that the trend of the law is not in that direction.
As the Washington Appellate Court has noted, the older rule
developed at a time when trial courts used less exacting
procedures for protecting a defendant's rights in accepting
a plea of guilty.

State v. Armstead, 13 Wash.App. 59, 533

P.2d 147, 149 (1975).

When the trial court has carefully

safeguarded the defendant's rights before accepting a guilty
plea, as it did in this case, the defendant should meet a
heavier burden in a motion to withdraw it.

The Washington

Court has adopted the test that a defendant should establish
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that a withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice*
This is the standard recommended in the ABA Standards
relating to Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, § 2.1 ((1968).
These standards provide:
"Withdrawal is necessary to correct
a manifest injustice whenever the defendant
proves that:
(1) he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by
constitution, statute, or rule;
(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorised
to so act in his behalf;
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was
entered without knowledge of the charge or that
the sentence actually imposed could be imposed;
(4) he did not receive the charge or
sentence concessions contemplated by the plea
agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed
to seek or not to oppose these concessions as
promised in the plea agreement; or
(5) he did not receive the charge or
sentence concessions contemplated by the plea
agreement concurred in by the court, aod he
did not affirm his plea after being advised
that the court no longer concurred and being
called upon to either affirm or withdraw his
plea."
The effective assistance of counsel will be discussed
in Point II, infra.

Appellant clearly does not come within the

other provisions of these standards, and should therefore not
be allowed to withdraw his plea.

It is surely a better practice

to use preventative rather than remedial practices in this
area of the law, and to insist that a defendant's rights are
fully protected at the time he enters the plea rather than
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~Q-

to provide an over-liberal remedy in the assumption they
are not protected.

55 Colum.L.Rev. 366, 380 (1955).

On

%

two occasions the trial court received evidence and heard
arguments in support of appellant's motion, and on each
occasion resolved the factual issue of the voluntariness
of the plea against the appellant.

This finding is

supported by substantial evidence.

The appellant was

presented with an information charging him in everyday

Q

4

language with the intentional and knowing possession of
marijuana.

Appellant is an intelligent adult who has

previously been convicted of that offense, and he stated

€

in open court that he understood the nature of the charge
as explained to him by the trial court.

Yet appellant

claims he withheld the information that his possession

i

was not "knowing" because he did not think it was
relevant.

Appellant's further contention that his desire

to withdraw his plea is based on Mr. Long's advice that he

•

had a defense is flatly contradicted by the record, as
appellant expressed'his dissatisfaction with his guilty
plea to the parole agent ten days prior to receiving

'

the advice (R.20,38).

I
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The indication in appellant's brief that questions
as to the legality of the search should be a factor in determining
the trial court's discretion is not well founded.

A guilty plea

waives all objections to the manner of obtainment of evidence.
Mach v. State, 492 P.2d 670 (Okla.Crim. 1972); Still v. State,
97 Idaho 375, 544 P.2d 1145 (1976).
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court's
refusal to allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty was
within the discretion granted that court by law, and supported
by substantial evidence.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
The second prong of appellant's argument that attempts
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court is
novel.

Appellant contends that the trial court must allow him

to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied effective
assistance of counsel.

It is not claimed that the counsel was

incompetent, uninterested or unwilling to present the appellant's
defenses.

The claim of counsel's ineffectiveness is based on

the fact that "he was not aware of certain pertinent facts which
imbued defendant with a defense to the charge."

Brief of

Appellant, page 15. Appellant hopes to make his own non-disclosure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of relevant facts to his admittedly competent counsel into
an automatic ground for a withdrawal of a guilty plea.

4

The adverse affect of such a rule upon the
administration of criminal justice is obvious. Any
criminal defendant could keep relevant facts from his

(

attorney, and enter a plea of guilty hoping to prejudice
the State's case by delay, or gain some advantage for
himself or a codefendant by a plea bargain.

The defendant

f

could then retain a new attorney, reveal his "newly"
discovered defense, and withdraw his plea as a matter of
right.

Public policy demands that the criminal law not

f

be subjected to such an abuse.
This is not to imply that a defendant may never
withdraw a plea upon discovery of a defense, only that

I

such a judgment is best committed to the discretion of
the trial court where the evidence can be best viewed and
balanced.

The trial court in this case gave a full and

i

fair hearing to appellant on this issue, its finding is
supported by the evidence, and should not be disturbed
on appeal.

'

Appellant has cited the cases of In Re Cronin,
336 A.2d 164 (Vermont, 1975), and State v. Kinchloe,
87 N.M. 34, 528 P.2d 893 (1974).

The court in the Cronin

case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

a juvenile's motion to withdraw a plea of guilty.

The

court felt that there was a possibility that a misunderstanding between the juvenile and his own attorney could
reasonably have led the juvenile to believe he was being
promised lenient sentencing in return for a plea of guilty.
The court held that if the plea was induced by such an
apparent promise, it was not voluntary and could be

'

withdrawn*
In Kinchloe, the New Mexico Court considered a
list of ten allegations made in respect to a criminal
defendant's counsel.

The list included counselfs terminal

illness, failure of counsel to discuss issues raised by
the defendant, and counsel's manifest desire to "get the
case over with."

In light of all of the factors, the

court held that defendant had received ineffective legal
assistance.

Neither of these cases come near establishing

the principle that unawareness of certain facts is
equivalent to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The case of Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d
20 (10th Cir. 1967), is more in point.

In that case,

a criminal defendant had hoped to interpose a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity, and counsel had given
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incorrect advice on the standard of mental responsibility.
The defendant claimed that the incorrect advice had robbed
his guilty plea of its voluntary character, and that he
should be able to withdraw it.

The Circuit Court affirmed

the trial court's refusal to allow a change of plea.
As this Court has made abundantly clear, a
defendant is entitled to the assistance of a competent
member of the Bar who shows a willingness to identify
himself with the interests of the defendant and present such
defenses that are available to him under the law and
consistent with the ethics of his profession*

Andreason

v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972); Alires v.
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969).

This requirement

is not met by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the
record by an attorney who manifests no real concern about
the interests of the accused.

However, the requirement does

not demand that the attorney's representation of the accused
be perfect, of that he present the case exactly as the
accused, with the benefit of hindsight, chooses to define
as "effective."

In this context, the language of Kryger v»

Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214, 479 P.2d 477 (1971), is appropriate.
In affirming the trial courtss denial of a writ of habeas
corpus, this Court stated:

•14-
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"In the instant action, there
is no allegation that counsel's
representation was a sham or a
pretense, but merely an assertion
that in retrospect counsel misapprehended
the facts allegedly related by the
plaintiffs and that he failed to interrogate the plaintiffs in regard to certain
particulars. Defense counsel actively
participated through all the critical
stages of the proceedings and admittedly
conferred with plaintiffs as to many of
the significant facts." 25 Utah 2d at
218.
The appellant in this action has not demonstrated
or alleged that his counsel was ineffective by the standards
established by this court.

Respondent submits that the trial

court's refusal to allow a change of plea be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities,
respondent respectfully submits that the refusal of the trial
court to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea was well
within the discretion granted that court by law.

The judgment

and sentence of the district court is without error, and
respondent respectfully submits the same should be affirmed
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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